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PERCEPTIONS, Winter 2013, Volume XVIII, Number 4, pp. 7-28.
economies particularly benefit from the 
rotating annual summits and from the 
less hegemonic distribution of power. 
Moreover, the G20 generates certain 
tangible spill-over effects, particularly 
as it is also a venue for collaboration in 
diplomatic and non-economic matters. 
The progressively increasing involvement 
of global civil society in G20 summits, as 
well as the US-Russian rapprochement 
on Syria at the 2013 Russia Summit, 
demonstrates this capacity. Whether 
the G20 will be a short-term crisis 
management organisation or a long-
term international governance structure 
that steers the world economy is still up 
to the members. 
Much ink has been spilled over how 
the 2008 crisis left the global economy 
in the lurch. Today, the G20 seems to 
be one of the rare collective attempts 
to pull the global economy out of 
its protracted recession. Despite its 
sophisticated institutional structure, the 
EU displays a colossal dysfunction in 
terms of finding a feasible solution to 
the eurozone crisis and its “weakest link” 
Abstract
Thus far, the G20 represents the most 
significant collective attempt to address the 
2008 economic crisis by the world’s largest 
economies. It is the only global platform that 
could serve as an institutional panacea for 
the protracted economic slowdown that has 
been experienced since 2008. This article 
analyses the G20 by situating it in the general 
historical-institutional context of the global 
economic governance. It compares and contrasts 
the G20 with the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Subsequently, some of the most pronounced 
criticisms of G20 are addressed, including 
concerns about possible “agenda creep” and the 
lack of a hegemonic underwriter. 
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Introduction 
Despite some harsh criticism, the G20 
remains a relevant platform for global 
economic governance. The emerging 
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the leading economic actors (the G8) to 
expand their exclusive club. Emerging 
economies were offered a seat at the 
commanding heights of global economy, 
for they proved to be more resilient than 
the members of the G8 in the face of this 
protracted recession. 
Thirdly, this article tackles the power 
dynamics within the G20. Given the 
diverse size and nature of the economies 
that constitute the G20, the organisation 
embodies significant opportunities as 
well as drawbacks. Compared to the 
exclusive league of the G8, which only 
included the advanced North American 
and European economies as well as 
Japan, the G20 certainly has more 
representative and democratic leverage. 
However, this greater representation also 
means addressing a much more diverse 
set of socio-economic and political 
concerns. Naturally, an expansion of 
membership increases the number of 
items on the agenda, making it harder to 
problem, other than possibly purging the 
underperformers.2 Across the Atlantic, 
the US Congress could not even pass the 
2014 budget, and the economy came to 
a grinding halt due partisan polarisation.
Given the inability of largest global 
economic actors to act as trailblazers 
out of the crisis-cum-recession, the 
G20 remains a critical venue as the 
only global platform to serve as an 
institutional panacea for the protracted 
crisis. This article is an attempt to 
analyse the G20 by situating it in the 
general historical-institutional context 
of the global economic governance. 
Albeit in a primitive form, the G20 
resembles post-Second World War 
efforts to institutionalise the global 
economy under the rubric of Bretton 
Woods system. Important differences 
remain, however. Most evident is the 
lack of a natural hegemon that can pave 
the way and overcome collective action 
problems.3 
The second point emphasised in this 
article is the particular role played by the 
2008 economic crisis in the evolution 
of the G20. Without a doubt the 2008 
crisis was a catalyst for the emergence of 
a new economic platform that brought 
together world’s top 20 economies. 
Numerous analysts and policymakers 
have highlighted the fact that the scale 
and scope of the 2008 crisis compelled 
Given the inability of largest 
global economic actors to 
act as trailblazers out of the 
crisis-cum-recession, the G20 
remains a critical venue as the 
only global platform to serve as 
an institutional panacea for the 
protracted crisis. 
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were working well, there would’ve been 
no need for the G-20. The reason that 
there is a need for the G-20 is that the 
leading economies of the world are no 
longer compatible, either culturally, 
historically, or economically. They are 
very different, and what they have to 
do is work this out. And that’s why the 
G-20 is absolutely necessary, because 
I believe they are in the process of 
working it out.4 
Paul Martin, Canadian Prime Minister
Why the G20?
A global economy based on free trade 
among nations has always required some 
form of steering in order to function 
smoothly. This was perhaps most acutely 
felt after the Great Depression of 1929. 
Subsequently, countries in North 
America and Western Europe got together 
in an effort to mitigate potentially the 
self-destructive tendencies of markets. 
Following the Second World War, 
they developed a new set of rules and 
institutions to regulate mutual economic 
interactions. As one American official 
at the time simply put it, prosperous 
neighbours were the best neighbours. 
Hence, American policy makers, “liberal 
visionaries and hard-nosed geopolitical 
strategists” alike, agreed upon building 
institutions to realise this goal. They 
established a new trade regime that 
“embedded” an open international trade 
regime that the US advocated, as well 
as supported the European style welfare 
synchronise the priorities of all members 
and reach an accord. 
In the last section, this article concludes 
with an optimistic note regarding the 
future of the G20. Upon weighing the 
pros and cons in the G20 debate, it states 
that the G20 has the potential to become 
a viable platform for global economic 
collaboration. Currently, the G20 is 
the most high-profile organisation 
that brings together both advanced 
industrialised and developing countries 
on equal footing, in an effort to tackle 
the pending issues of global economy. 
Moreover, the issues are not confined to 
economic housekeeping. G20 Summits 
might have serious spill-over effects in 
international collaboration, as seen with 
the inception of “Business 20”, “Think 
20” and “Youth 20” summits. At the 2013 
Moscow Summit, diplomatic overtures 
between Russia and the US on Syria 
might have very well averted another 
premature US intervention in the Middle 
East. This and many other incidents of 
diplomatic rapprochement at the annual 
summits illustrate the value of the G20 
as an emerging platform of multifaceted 
global governance. However, it would be 
prudent to maintain our caution. In the 
absence of a clear protagonist, the G20 
can only achieve the goals to which its 
members collectively aspire. 
If the Doha Round was working 
marvellously, and if all these institutions 
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Europe and obliterated Japan. As such, 
it was able to craft a system according to 
its own image, which meant capitalist 
economy and liberal democracy.6 The 
liberal institutionalists, on the other hand, 
counter the hegemony argument and 
emphasise the convergence of mutual 
interests and rational collaboration 
among the key actors. From their 
perspective, by creating the Bretton 
Woods institutions, such as the IMF and 
the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD, later the 
World Bank), the US was not solely 
trying to perpetuate its hegemony, but 
was laying the institutional groundwork 
for interdependence.7 
Either way, the Bretton Woods regime 
established a distinct set of rules and 
institutions, and served the interests 
of its members rather well. Compared 
to the rest of the world, the citizens of 
Western Europe, Japan, US and Canada 
enjoyed the highest levels of peace and 
prosperity for decades to come. Alas, 
the Bretton Woods system did not last 
forever. Eventually, it gave way to new 
institutional arrangements among the 
free market economies. These ranged 
from GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) to the WTO (World 
Trade Organisation). The accumulated 
wisdom and experience of more than 
half a century illustrates the fact that, far 
from being the bastion of the “invisible 
states.5 Named after the idyllic town in 
New Hampshire where the meetings 
took place, this new economic regime 
came to be known as the Bretton Woods 
system. 
Two important schools in international 
political economy (IPE) have 
competing explanations for the post-
war international economic order that 
emerged under the explicit leadership of 
the US at Bretton Woods. One the one 
hand, there is the realist school and its 
several incarnations. For them, politics 
and power dynamics are the dominant 
variable, which grants secondary role 
to economics in their analysis. As their 
name implies, the hegemonic stability 
theorists emphasise the role of the US as 
the underwriter of the new economic 
order. The US came out powerful and 
virtually unscathed from a war that 
destroyed most of the Great Powers of 
The accumulated wisdom 
and experience of more than 
half a century illustrates the 
fact that, far from being the 
bastion of the “invisible hand”, 
an international system of free 
trade requires certain norms, 
rules and formal institutional 
structures in order to function 
efficiently.
The G20 and Global Economic Governance during a Protracted Recession
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report by the prominent UN Economic 
Commission on Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) aptly summarises 
the birth of the G20 in the following 
way: 
This [2008] crisis has also led to the 
Group of Twenty (G20), which includes 
the main emerging countries, displacing 
the traditional Group of Eight (G8) as 
the foremost international forum of 
economic decision-making. The G20 is 
expected to foster greater coordination 
as regards fiscal stimuli, financial 
stabilization and the reform of the 
international financial system.10
Now in its fifth year, the 2008 crisis 
has revealed both the growing power 
and significance of developing countries 
for the world economy. According to 
ECLAC, between 2000 and 2008, these 
countries accounted for approximately 
two-thirds of the growth in world 
output, “increasing their share from 
37 to 45%”.11 Stronger economic 
performance brought greater demand 
for global economic governance. The 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China) in particular became greater 
advocates of more representative and fair 
international institutional frameworks. 
Table 1 below illustrates the average 
annual growth rate gap between 
developing and advanced economies in 
the last decade.
hand”, an international system of free 
trade requires certain norms, rules and 
formal institutional structures in order 
to function efficiently.8 
Periods of severe economic crisis test 
the capabilities of existing institutional 
frameworks. Starting with the 1997-98 
economic crises, the top eight economies 
in the world (Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK and the 
US- the Group of 8 or G8) recognised 
the need to include the voices of the 
developing world in order to address 
the problems of a global economy in a 
more comprehensive manner. However, 
the 2008 economic crisis proved to be 
more critical in terms of exposing the 
shortcomings of the G8 framework. The 
severity and duration of the 2008 crisis 
compelled the established rulers of the 
game (i.e. the US, Western Europe and 
Japan) to broaden their exclusive circle. 
In a sense, they accepted a dilution 
of their powers in an effort to save the 
system as a whole. Furthermore, there 
was also a significant change in the 
participant profile. Starting with the 
2008 summit, finance ministers and 
central bank managers who were the 
original participants in G8 summits were 
accompanied by their heads of state/
government. The participation of heads 
of government inevitably increased the 
profile of the G20 summits.9 A recent 
Evren Çelik Wiltse
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Table 1: Average annual GDP growth rates, BRICS, the US, the UK and Turkey 
(2002-2013)
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Brazil 2.7 1.1 5.7 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.2 -0.3 7.5 2.7 0.9 2.5 3.4
China 9.1 10.0 10.1 11.3 12.7 14.2 9.6 9.2 10.4 9.3 7.7 7.6 10.1
Germany 0.0 -0.4 0.7 0.8 3.9 3.4 0.8 -5.1 3.9 3.4 0.9 0.5 1.1
India 3.8 8.4 7.9 9.3 9.3 9.8 3.9 8.5 10.5 6.3 3.2 3.8 7.1
Russia 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2 -7.8 4.5 4.3 3.4 1.5 4.4
Turkey 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.2 8.8 2.2 3.8 5.0
UK 2.3 3.9 3.2 3.2 2.8 3.4 -0.8 -5.2 1.7 1.1 0.2 1.4 1.4
US 1.8 2.8 3.8 3.4 2.7 1.8 -0.3 -2.8 2.5 1.8 2.8 1.6 1.8
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database October 2013 (% change in GDP, constant prices).
It is important to understand both 
the emergence and growing significance 
of the G20 in this historical context. 
The fast-paced evolution of the global 
economy, as well as the changes in 
relative distribution of power, is straining 
the existing structures of economic 
governance. The 2008 crisis and its 
aftermath triggered an existential crisis 
in Europe, and caused record levels of 
unemployment and public debt in the 
US. However, as Table 2 below illustrates, 
the same period looks like a boon for 
countries like China, Brazil, India 
and Russia. Despite the unfavourable 
economic climate, BRIC countries are 
steadily rising towards the upper echelons 
of the global economy. According to IMF 
forecasts, while advanced industrialised 
countries are expected to grow around 
1.4% in 2013, developing counties will 
have average growth rates of 5.5%. This 
relative resilience in the face of profound 
economic crisis certainly augments the 
powers of developing countries at the 
table. They demand reforms for greater 
inclusion in international economic 
governance. 
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Table 2: Ranking of Top 20 Economies According to Size (2003-2012)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
1 US US US US US US US US US US
2 Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan Japan China China China
3 Germany Germany Germany Germany China China China Japan Japan Japan
4 UK UK UK China Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany Germany
5 France France China UK UK France France France France France
6 China China France France France UK UK UK Brazil UK
7 Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Italy Brazil UK Brazil
8 Canada Spain Canada Canada Canada Russia Brazil Italy Italy Russia
9 Spain Canada Spain Spain Spain Brazil Spain India Russia Italy
10 Mexico Mexico Brazil Brazil Brazil Spain Canada Canada India India
11 Korea Korea Mexico Russia Russia Canada India Russia Canada Canada
12 India India Korea Mexico India India Russia Spain Australia Australia
13 Brazil Brazil India Korea Korea Mexico Australia Australia Spain Spain
14 Netherlands Australia Russia India Mexico Australia Mexico Mexico Mexico Mexico
15 Australia Netherlands Australia Australia Australia Korea Korea Korea Korea Korea
16 Russia Russia Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands Indonesia Indonesia
17 Swiss Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Turkey Netherlands Turkey
18 Sweden Swiss Swiss Swiss Sweden Poland Indonesia Indonesia Turkey Netherlands
19 Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Belgium Swiss Swiss Swiss S.Arabia S.Arabia
20 Turkey Sweden Sweden Sweden Swiss S.Arabia Belgium S.Arabia Swiss Swiss
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database October 2013 (GDP, current US$).
The Formal Structure of the 
G20
Even though G20 meetings have been 
taking place since 2000, earlier sessions 
maintained a technocratic profile, for 
they were attended solely by finance 
ministers and central bank directors. The 
G20 gained a whole new momentum 
when leaders’ summits were introduced 
after 2008. The first leaders’ summit took 
place in Washington, DC, in November 
2008. At the April 2009 London 
Summit, G20 leaders collaborated to 
increase the funds available for the IMF. 
They contributed to extra US $500 
billion to the IMF’s expanded New 
Arrangement to Borrow (NAB). This 
was an interesting moment, for some 
members of the G20 (such as Brazil, 
India and Turkey) had hitherto been net 
borrowers from the IMF, whereas they 
now became creditors of this mighty 
international financial institution. After 
Evren Çelik Wiltse
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are all organisations that have spun off 
from the original G20 meetings. Critics 
of the G20 point to this development 
as potentially distracting. They argue 
that the agenda of the G20 will become 
so open-ended that nothing can be 
accomplished. It dilutes the focus and 
energy of the organisation. Moreover, 
the rotating chairs also try to put their 
imprint on the summit by highlighting 
an issue that is near and dear to them. 
At the Seoul Summit, development was 
added to the G20 agenda. In 2012, 
Mexico was particularly insistent on 
“green growth”. The Russian presidency 
in 2013 emphasised “growth with jobs”. 
While this “personal touch” is a source 
of motivation for the host countries, 
at the same time it might create an 
inflation of “honourable missions” for 
the G20 to tackle. It is possible that the 
rotating presidency aspect of the G20 is 
partly responsible for the “agenda creep” 
concerns. 
The leader-centric characteristic of 
G20 carries certain advantages and 
London, came the much-publicised 
Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009. 
Here, US President Obama declared 
that the G20 would be the “premier 
forum” for international economic 
coordination”. He also highlighted the 
need for a more balanced representation 
in global economic governance 
institutions, which culminated in a 
reallocation of 5% of voting shares from 
over-represented countries to the under-
represented.12 
The structure of the G20 consists of a 
rotating presidency among the member 
nations. The president hosts the summit 
each year. However, in order to establish 
continuity a three-member “troika” 
consisting of the immediate past, present 
and future presidents coordinates the 
summit. The 2012 summit was hosted 
by Mexico, which then passed the banner 
to Russia to host the summit in 2013. In 
2014, Australia will be hosting the G20 
summit. Turkey will be hosting the G20 
summit in 2015. 
Since its inception, G20 summits 
have been expanding in terms of both 
number of members and agenda items. 
Whereas initial meetings convened 
mostly technocrats in top economic 
decision-making, recent annual meetings 
include business, labour, civil society 
and youth leaders. Business 20, Think 
20, Civil 20, Labor 20 and Youth 20 
At Bretton Woods, the 
hegemonic position of the US 
provided the economic backing, 
political will and credible 
enforcement mechanisms that 
were believed to be necessary to 
move forward. 
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re-election campaign. This self-centred 
attitude undermined the collective 
purpose of the G20 that year, which 
was a key meeting in the midst of euro 
crisis.14
Is the G20 Another Bretton 
Woods in the Making?
While the circumstances leading to 
the emergence of the G20 have some 
similarities with the Bretton Woods 
era, the differences are probably more 
pronounced. First, the G20 is not a 
usual international organisation (IO). It 
does not have a formal charter. It has no 
established bureaucracy, no headquarters 
or standing committees. Each year, one of 
the members hosts the annual meeting. 
“Sherpas” from each country act as the 
country representatives. As it stands, the 
G20 is a loosely structured and leader-
focused arrangement, whereby top 
leaders of world’s largest economies meet 
annually. The emphasis is on process and 
consensus building at the top level.
Secondly, there is the issue of relative 
power distribution within the group. 
Unlike the Bretton Woods process, 
the G20 gives equal position to all its 
members. Advanced economies and 
emerging economies are on a par with 
each other. Moreover, there is no overt 
exercise of US hegemony. At Bretton 
disadvantages. At times, host countries 
and their leaders work hard to put their 
mark on the event. They choose to 
emphasise an agenda item and promote 
the summit in ways that will also 
promote their country’s global presence. 
This was clearly observed in the Mexican 
case in 2012. First, Mexican President 
Felipe Calderon moved the summit 
to an earlier date- that is, prior to the 
Mexican presidential elections in 2012- 
so that he, rather than his successor, 
could host this prestigious event (the 
Mexican Constitution bans re-election 
of presidents). Under Calderon’s 
stewardship, Mexico spent significant 
effort to augment the institution of 
G20 by holding the first ever Foreign 
Ministers’ Summit at Los Cabos. This 
was perceived as a welcome move as it 
facilitated diplomatic cooperation and 
collaboration among the G20 members. 
Even to those who were rather sceptical 
of the G20 summits gave due credit to 
President Calderon’s performance: “The 
efforts of the Mexican presidency allowed 
for limited progress in a number of areas, 
thereby sparing the summit from being 
characterized as a total failure”.13
However, the leader-centric aspect of 
G20 summits can also go remarkably 
wrong. France in 2011 is case in point. 
At the 2011 Cannes Summit, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy acted as if the 
whole event was a stage for his national 
Evren Çelik Wiltse
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In contrast to the G7, which was 
composed of states with relatively the 
same interests and that were accepting 
of the United States’ dominant role, 
the G20 includes geopolitical rivals and 
states with widely diverging capabilities 
and agendas.15
The lack of a hegemonic underwriter for 
the G20 project is increasingly perceived 
as a weakness by the sceptics. Among 
them, the economist Nouriel Roubini, 
famous for his accurate projections of 
global macroeconomic trends, has stated 
that “we are going to G-Zero, with no 
global economic governance”.16
Woods, the hegemonic position of the 
US provided the economic backing, 
political will and credible enforcement 
mechanisms that were believed to be 
necessary to move forward. In the case 
of G20 however, the absence of a clear 
hierarchical pecking order makes some 
analysts rather sceptical. They argue that 
such a large and diverse set of actors 
cannot align their competing interests 
and cooperate on substantive matters. 
Morgan, for instance, is particularly 
critical of the new members:
Chart 1: The GDP of G20 members, including the EU 27 (2012, in current US$)
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators/wdi-2012 [last visited 10 November 2013].
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Chart 2: The comparative economic size of G20 members, excluding the EU 27
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Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators/wdi-2012 [last visited 10 November 2013].
Charts 1 and 2 above illustrate the 
relative size of the G20 economies. As seen 
in Chart 1, the EU is the largest entity, 
as it combines 27 national economies. 
However, the EU is far from leading 
the pack as the hegemon. The eurozone 
crisis has exposed the EU’s shortcomings 
as an internally coherent economic actor, 
especially when it comes to coordinating 
fiscal policy. This leaves the stage open for 
the US, who is the natural contender for 
hegemony. Yet, many analysts on various 
sides of the ideological spectrum concur 
that, in the last two decades, the US has 
been experiencing a hegemonic decline 
for various reasons. Consequently, it 
is not in a position to lead the way, or 
absorb the costs of collective action 
under the G20 framework. The third in 
line is China. There has been a cottage 
industry of scholarship and punditry on 
the phenomenal growth rates of China’s 
economy. However, analysts have not 
yet reported serious muscle-flexing 
by the Chinese single-party rulers in 
ways that would hint aspirations of a 
hegemonic role in global economy. Low 
per capita incomes, massive stockpiles of 
labour in rural China and the delicate 
balance between a capitalist economy 
in a socialist one-party political system 
make domestic concerns more urgent for 
the Chinese leaders than underwriting 
the rules of the game in new global 
institutions. This then brings us to the 
mid-level economic powers: from Japan 
Evren Çelik Wiltse
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fronts (i.e. business, civil society, youth, 
etc.) might help the actors perceive the 
global economic game as a “complex 
interdependent” exchange18 à la Keohane 
and Nye, rather than one of hegemonic 
domination and subservience. 
Consequently, the G-Zero environment 
might very well facilitate the formation 
of a more democratic and egalitarian 
global institutional framework. Lack of 
a hegemonic actor might prove to be an 
asset for the G20, rather than a liability. 
A third important point of deviation 
of G20 from the Bretton Woods model 
concerns the agenda setting. In the case 
of Bretton Woods, the agenda was laid 
out clearly from the start, largely by the 
US. In contrast, the G20 has not had an 
agenda that is set in stone- yet. While 
it emerged as an effort to address the 
2008 economic crisis, the diversity of its 
members, as well as the rotation of host 
countries inevitably alter the issues that 
show up on the G20 agenda annually. 
This situation invites “agenda creep” 
criticisms, especially from economic 
policy technocrats. 
Initially, the focus of G20 was almost 
exclusively on economic stability and 
fiscal policy. Given this tight definition 
of its scope, only finance ministers 
and central bank directors attended 
the meetings. As the G20 process has 
evolved, participation has expanded, 
and Germany, to France, the UK and 
Brazil. While each is a commendable 
actor in their respective region, none has 
the capacity to act as the hegemon on a 
global scale. 
In short, Roubini’s characterisation of 
the current global power distribution 
as “G-Zero” might be apt in the sense 
that no country enjoys indubitable 
superiority over the others. This vacuum 
of leadership, combined with a set 
of developing countries that lack the 
economic leverage and/or political will 
to shape the new global institutional 
structures constitute significant problems 
for global economic governance, 
according to Roubini.17 
However, the leadership void this may 
not necessarily be a handicap for the 
G20. What is considered a deficiency 
from the (neo)realist perspectives might 
even be a blessing from a more liberal 
standpoint. The lack of a predominant 
player may trigger genuine coalition 
building across a diverse set of economic 
actors. These interactions on several 
The eurozone crisis has exposed 
the EU’s shortcomings as an 
internally coherent economic 
actor, especially when it comes 
to coordinating fiscal policy. 
The G20 and Global Economic Governance during a Protracted Recession
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crisis illustrated that even among the 
advanced economies there is significant 
variation. While Europe is trying to save 
its welfare states, the US is trying to 
strengthen it with comprehensive health 
care reforms. Moreover, the absence of a 
hegemonic agenda setter means that the 
priorities of all G20 participants may not 
be perfectly aligned at any given point. 
When compared to the Bretton Woods 
system, the G20 displays a significantly 
different institutional structure and 
power distribution pattern. The graphic 
below illustrates the diverse priorities 
of the emerging economies vis-à-vis the 
advanced ones.
and now includes top political leaders, 
business elites, think-tanks and civil 
society activists. These new groups 
brought with them new issues to be 
addressed by the G20. A medley of 
concerns, ranging from green growth to 
fossil fuel subsidies, and food security to 
corruption, have been included on the 
G20’s agenda. 
The fact remains that the members of 
the G20 are a diverse group with very 
different economic concerns. Some 
advocate a classic neo-liberal economic 
model, while others like China 
implement state-led capitalism. The 2008 
Graphic 1: The compatibility of issues at the G20
Priorities of rising economies Priorities of Advanced Economies
Finance 
sector 
reform
Commodity 
price stability
Development, 
green growth
Free 
trade
Employment
Fiscal discipline/ 
stability
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liberalise its services. And the list 
went on. 
 However, without a potent 
mechanism to enforce such 
recommendations, it is not clear 
whether members would be obliged 
to follow them. Both Germany and 
China maintain large trade surpluses, 
and perceive this as in their own 
national interests. In contrast many 
other countries, particularly those 
in Southern Europe, have bled 
white under the strain of chronic 
trade deficits. Kemal Derviş of the 
Brookings Institute highlights these 
diverging priorities and potential lack 
of cohesion among the G20 members 
as a point of concern. Unfortunately, 
the G20 has not yet developed the 
right tool-kit to address this issue of 
divergent national interests.19
•	 Changing existing governance 
structures: The pillars of today’s 
global economic order were created 
after the Second World War. Thus, 
they reflect the power dynamics 
of that era. Echoing the world of 
1945, key international financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank 
and the IMF, give significant powers 
and representation to the Western 
nations. 
 In the last decades, many contenders 
have challenged the superstructures 
Challenges in Front of the 
G20: 
•	 Conflicting national interests: At the 
2012 summit, members of the G20 
agreed to subject their respective 
economic performances to the 
scrutiny of the group through the 
IMF. This step will increase the 
viability of any effort to coordinate 
the global economy. As such, certain 
recommendations emerged from the 
2012 Los Cabos Summit. The advice 
was wide-ranging but specific. For 
example, it was recommended that 
China bring down its phenomenally 
high savings rates and slow down 
its rate of reserve accumulation. 
Furthermore, most countries agreed 
that China has maintained an 
artificially low exchange rate, which 
gives an unfair edge to Chinese 
exports. Consequently, they advised 
China to allow more realistic 
exchange rates. 
 At the same time, Turkey and Brazil 
were asked to do something about 
their low savings rates. Both countries 
have impressive growth rates but this 
performance is not sustainable given 
the meagre ratio of domestic savings. 
Germany appears to be doing rather 
well compared to the crisis-riddled 
eurozone, but it too was told to 
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global economic governance, one 
that is commensurate with their new 
economic might. 
•	 Regulating the financial sector: The 
task of global economic coordination 
and governance under the G20 entails 
financial regulation of more than 
20 banking systems. Today, there is 
nearly uniform consensus that the 
economic crisis of 2008 was due to 
the blunders of the financial sector, 
which started with the subprime 
mortgage markets in the US and 
spread like wild fire. Because the 
banks were “too big to fail”, the US 
and other countries devised massive 
rescue packages to save the banks and 
their respective national economies. 
 According to Paul Krugman, banks 
today are even larger than they were 
during the 2008 crisis. It seems 
that financial institutions have an 
insatiable appetite to merge and 
expand into behemoths. At the same 
time, their governors are extremely 
savvy about ways to avoid regulation, 
public scrutiny and oversight.20 Yet, 
problems in the financial sector 
severely undermine the performance 
of the real sectors of the economy, 
creating a credit crunch or overall 
macroeconomic instability. 
 Tackling this issue will be a major 
challenge for the G20. Part of the 
of the old economic order. The centre 
of global economic power is rapidly 
shifting to the Southern and Eastern 
hemispheres, with the rise of the 
Asia-Pacific region and the BRICs. 
Predictably, these emerging countries 
desire the top international economic 
institutions to be more representative 
and democratic. However, such 
demands come at the expense of the 
established Western powers. 
 The G20 will be an important venue 
for negotiating the re-structuring 
of global economic governance. 
Emerging economies have already 
displayed their commitment to 
global governance. They effectively 
saved the IMF from obscurity, when 
they transferred massive amounts of 
funds to the Fund at the peak of the 
global recession. Recent assessments 
note that emerging markets account 
for more than two thirds of global 
economic growth. It is only fair that 
these nations are expecting a more 
equitable distribution of power in 
Rather than trying to tackle 
massive financial conglomerates 
separately countries would be 
better off by combining their 
forces and amplifying their 
power.
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The Future of the G20: 
Prospects and Drawbacks
Most analysts of the G20 point 
at “agenda creep” as a major source 
of concern. As discussed above, the 
G20 initiative has gained significant 
momentum after the 2008 crisis, 
with an overwhelming emphasis on 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal policy 
coordination. However, as the emerging 
economies became more and more 
involved, issues of economic growth 
and development have also been added 
to the agenda. Subsequently, sustainable 
energy, phasing-out of fossil fuels, green 
growth, food security and climate change 
have become part of the G20 agenda. 
Critiques argue that the G20 will 
soon have “agenda fatigue” due to this 
exponentially increasing list of noble 
causes. Similar criticisms have also been 
raised by the technocratic teams of each 
of the G20 members, who tend to prefer 
a narrow and tightly defined scope for 
the G20. Staffs of finance ministries and 
central banks generally claim that a too 
diffuse agenda dilutes the effectiveness 
of the G20. From their perspective, the 
G20 should “stick to its original agenda”, 
to have global financial stability and 
coordination as its foremost goal. 
This “agenda creep” criticism does 
carry some merit. Certainly, the G20 
problem lies in the varying ideological 
positions of the G20 leaders. While 
some of the centrist and leftist leaders 
are eager to reign in the financial 
sector, those on the right are not 
generally enthusiastic supporters of 
financial regulation. For instance, 
since London is a major hub of global 
finance, the conservative Prime 
Minister of the UK is adamant about 
blocking any measures that will clamp 
down on finance capital. Regarding 
financial sector regulations, Turkey 
is in the pro-regulation camp, along 
with most of the emerging markets. 
 Financial regulation is more likely 
to be resolved in a collective setting 
than through action by individual 
nations. Rather than trying to tackle 
massive financial conglomerates 
separately countries would be better 
off by combining their forces and 
amplifying their power. If the stars 
align and a powerful pro-regulation 
coalition can emerge within the G20, 
it could offer a great opportunity 
to address the distortions and 
malfunctions of the finance sector. 
Meanwhile, we might have to settle 
for the ad hoc cases of criminal 
charges, such as JP Morgan’s London 
Whale scandal in 2012, or its US $13 
billion settlement for mortgage fraud 
in 2013.21
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examples of international collaboration 
illustrate that cooperation in one area 
tends to provide positive spill-over effects 
in other areas. A notable example is the 
1950 coal and steel partnership between 
France and Germany, which paved the 
way for the EU of today. Consequently, 
the efforts by foreign ministers, business 
and civil society representatives at the 
G20 summits should not be perceived 
as “distractions” from the main cause. 
Rather, they should be utilised to 
amplify the economic collaboration 
efforts among the member nations. 
cannot have a completely open-ended 
approach to agenda setting, wherein 
new items are added at every summit 
to an ever-growing to-do list. Yet, this 
zero-sum perspective also assumes 
that collaboration in different areas, 
such as diplomacy or environment, 
would come at the expense of financial 
sphere. Essentially, the advocates of a 
streamlined agenda conceptualise the 
G20 exclusively in an economic and 
technocratic manner.
Contrary to the arguments of “agenda 
creep” critiques, most successful 
Table 3: GDP per capita of the G20 members (2012, in US$ purchasing power 
parity (ppp) adjusted) 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2012, at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators/wdi-2012 [last visited 10 November 2013].
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Another response to accusations of 
agenda creep can be found in the diversity 
of the G20 members. As Table 3 above 
displays, the G20 includes countries 
with per capita incomes of more than US 
$40,000 (US, Australia and Canada) to 
less than US $10,000 (China, Indonesia 
and India). The difference between US 
and Indonesia is nearly tenfold. By their 
very nature, these economies do not have 
a singular concern that impacts them 
across the board equally. As the platform 
expands, so does the agenda. It is no 
surprise that at the 2010 Seoul Summit 
“development” was added to the agenda, 
since it is a pressing concern for nearly 
half of the G20 members who have 
yet to reach the US $20,000 per capita 
income threshold. 
A second issue that is frequently cited 
by the analysts is the eurozone crisis. The 
ongoing tribulations of the eurozone 17 
seem to be hurting the effectiveness of the 
G20. Since the institutional structures of 
global economic governance are heavily 
skewed towards European and North 
American economies, their troubles are 
crippling the international efforts for 
stability. As seen in Chart 1, the EU, with 
its 28 members, constitutes the largest 
economic block in the G20. Almost five 
years into the crisis, Europeans seem 
unable to find a feasible solution to the 
unsustainable gap between its export-
oriented, surplus-generating economies 
and import-oriented, deficit-generating 
economies. The costs of borrowing 
remain high for Europe’s debtors, and 
Germany seems extremely reluctant to 
allow growth with inflation. Instead, the 
locomotive of the euro calls for more 
austerity, choking the overall economic 
system.22 
As they muddle through this crisis, 
Europe is effectively acting as a damper 
on the potential progress of G20. Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz describes a rather 
frosty exchange, when he comments on 
the lack of solidarity within Europe: 
One very senior government official 
of a northern European country did 
not even put down his fork when 
interrupted by an earnest dinner 
companion who pointed out that many 
Spaniards now eat out of garbage cans. 
They should’ve reformed earlier, he 
replied, as he continued to eat his steak.
Stiglitz too is among those who 
observe a gradual shift towards a G-Zero 
world, but he is optimistic about the 
performance of the emerging markets. 
Globalisation brings interdependence 
of risk. As long as the US and Europe 
The costs of borrowing remain 
high for Europe’s debtors, and 
Germany seems extremely 
reluctant to allow growth with 
inflation. 
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do not “torpedo developing countries”, 
global economic growth might resume, 
despite the “failures of the West”.23
In the early stages of the 2008 crisis, 
financial institutions were bailed out by 
sovereign funds, with the excuse that they 
were too-big-to-fail. Today, they are even 
bigger and riskier, as the case of banking 
crisis in Cyprus has tragically revealed. 
Yet, five years into the crisis, effective 
regulation of the financial sector still 
remains on the back burner of the G20 
agenda. Financial regulation with teeth, 
the adoption of some kind of financial 
transaction tax and the elimination of 
tax havens constitute the soft underbelly 
of the G20. While countries like Mexico, 
France and most recently Russia strongly 
endorse regulation, the Anglo-American 
alliance seems to avoid the discussion at 
all costs. 
Reforms in the financial sector 
carry significant repercussions for the 
members of the G20. Despite the 
massive influx of public funds, it is 
unfortunate that the corporate culture 
of astronomical bonuses and lack of 
transparency or accountability remains 
untouched, particularly in the US. 
Even when caught red handed, financial 
institutions, such as HSBC, are now 
“too big to jail”.24 Token penalties do 
not seem sufficient deterrents to alter 
the culture of impunity in the financial 
sector. Even the 2008 crisis could have 
been used as an opportunity to address 
the abuses in the financial sector. Earlier 
in the crisis, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) were systematically 
denied credit by large commercial banks 
on the grounds that they were too risky 
and not commercially viable. However, 
in the developing world, SMEs account 
for nearly half of the labour force in 
manufacturing. Their access to credit and 
financial services is a critical component 
for growth and development. The 
G20 has multiple members with the 
experience of development banks and 
community banks. Canada, India, Brazil 
and Germany could offer significant 
experience in terms of SME-sensitive 
and development-friendly banking 
practices.25 Since financial sector 
reforms are among Russia’s top agenda 
items in 2013, one can only hope that 
aforementioned countries will rise up 
to the plate and come up with concrete 
proposals. 
While countries like Mexico, 
France and most recently Russia 
strongly endorse regulation, the 
Anglo-American alliance seems 
to avoid the discussion at all 
costs. 
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Interestingly, the activism of emerging 
economies may become especially 
significant while Europe is bogged down 
in an existential nightmare. At the Los 
Cabos Summit in 2012, emerging 
economies contributed US $65 billion 
to the IMF’s emergency funds. The 
goal of this contribution was to buttress 
the Fund against an escalation of the 
eurozone crisis.26 The seeds of a solution 
to eurozone problems might already be 
embedded within the G20. A strong and 
viable G20 that has an equitable structure 
of representation between developed and 
emerging economies would have the 
wherewithal to pull the eurozone out of 
this quandary. 
Lastly, the 2013 Moscow Summit may 
not be remembered for its economic 
success. However, it certainly will 
be memorable for the political and 
diplomatic breakthrough that it catered 
to. At a time when the US President 
was leaning strongly towards a military 
intervention in Syria due to alleged 
chemical weapons use by the Assad 
regime, the Moscow Summit proved to 
be the perfect opportunity to discuss 
the issue face to face with the Russian 
Premier, who happened to be an ally of 
the Syrian regime.27 Subsequent to the 
summit, the US pushed the military 
option onto the back burner and deferred 
the subject to a larger international 
audience, particularly including Russia 
and China. This is probably one of the 
most high profile incidents wherein an 
economic collaboration venue lent itself 
to collaboration on military/strategic 
issues. 
Conclusion
It is too early to decide whether G20 
actions to date have been a success or 
failure. Despite some harsh criticism, the 
G20 is still a relevant platform for global 
economic governance, for it annually 
brings together top leaders of the world’s 
largest 20 economies. Moreover, it 
yields some tangible results as a venue 
for collaboration on non-economic 
matters as well. The members of the G20 
constitute about two-thirds of the world 
population and account for 90% of 
global GDP. Whether it will be a short-
term crisis management organisation, 
or a long-term international governance 
structure that steers the world economy, 
is still up to the members. 
Despite some harsh criticism, 
the G20 is still a relevant 
platform for global economic 
governance, for it annually 
brings together top leaders of the 
world’s largest 20 economies.
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